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I. INTRODUCTION
Letters of credit provide buyers, sellers, and banks with
certainty' and security2 in international business transac-
tions.3 The letter of credit functions as the contemplated means
1. See generally Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-
65 (2d. Cir. 1970) (stating that assurance is a primary goal of letters of credit);
Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1543
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); Arthur Fama,
Jr., Note, Letters of Credit: The Role of Issuer Discretion in Determining Documen-
tary Compliance, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1983).
2. New York Life Ins. Co. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562, 566
(Conn. 1977) (stating that letters of credit function as security for payment from a
solvent buyer); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY
CREDIT OPERATIONS: INCLUDING UNIFORM CUSTOM AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY
CREDITS 6 (International Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 415, 1985) (stating
that letters of credit offer parties security in the transaction).
3. Sellers can avoid three risks by requiring their buyers to obtain letters of
credit: (1) the buyer's insolvency, (2) the buyer's good faith dissatisfaction with the
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by which the parties' expectations will be met.4 Ideally, the
seller expects to be and is promptly paid after its shipment of
goods and presentment of conforming documents. The buyer
expects and, indeed, receives the goods after reimbursing the
payor and presenting the documents to the shipper.5
Courts have enhanced certainty and predictability by hold-
ing that where the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documen-
tary Credits (UCP) is silent or ambiguous, parties may resort to
analogous provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).'
Specifically, a majority of U.S. courts have construed UCP
article 16(c)'s "reasonable time" for an issuer to dishonor a letter
of credit as three banking days, analogous to the UCC.' Recent-
goods, and (3) the buyer's wrongful rejection of the goods. Fama, Jr., supra note 1,
at 1521; see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 19-1, at 806 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that letters of credit help sellers reduce
risks of releasing goods prior to payment); Neil J. Rubenstein, The Issuer's Rights
and Obligations Under a Letter of Credit, 17 UCC L.J. 129, 130 (1984) (noting that
letters of credit help avoid delivery without payment).
The letter of credit allows the buyer to avoid the risk of paying for goods
that might never arrive due to loss, destruction, or nondelivery. Henry Harfield, Who
Does What to Whom: The Letter of Credit Mechanism, 17 UCC L.J. 291, 295 (1985).
4. Robert M. Rosenblith, Seeking a Waiver of Documentary Discrepancies from
the Account Party: Unexplored Legal Problems, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 81, 82 (1990).
5. Id. at 83; see also WILLIAM C. HILLMAN, LETTERS OF CREDIT: CURRENT
THINKING IN AMERICA 3-4 (1987).
6. See United Bank, Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254
(1976); Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urunleri Dis Ticaret Ve
Sanayi, A.S., 748 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying UCC by analogy to
credit subject to UCP); Prustcher v. Fidelity Intl Bank, 502 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (authorizing application of UCC to a UCP letter of credit); Bank of Cochin,
Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(utilizing UCC by analogy), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986);
Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking Corp.
787 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (S.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992); see
also Charles del Busto, Operational Rules for Letters of Credit: Effect of New Uni-
form Customs and Practice Rules, 17 UCC L.J. 298, 303 (1985) (suggesting that the
United States uses UCC terms to define UCP); Robert M. Rosenblith, What Happens
When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining Letter of Credit Transaction and Other Legal
Stratagems, 17 UCC L.J. 307, 309 (1985) (noting that if the UCP is silent, bankers
look to the UCC). But see Fertico Belgium, S.A. v. Phosphate Chem. Export Ass'n,
473 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1st Dept. 1984) (subjecting credit to UCP makes UCC inap-
plicable); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 19-1, at 807 n.3 (stating that UCP
complements UCC, but sometimes displaces it).
7. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1141; (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co.,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 821 (2d. Cir. 1992); Bank of
Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1539 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding three days the maximum allowable time), affd on other grounds, 808
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); Rosenblith, supra note 6, at 330 (noting that the three-day
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ly, however, the Second Circuit reasoned that article 16(c)'s "rea-
sonable time" was not ambiguous, and declined to apply the
UCC's three-day rule.'
In September 1988, Alaska Textile Company sued Chase
Manhattan Bank in the New York Supreme Court, alleging the
bank wrongfully dishonored letters of credit9 by violating the
timely notice provisions of the UCP. 1° Chase Manhattan Bank
removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York." The district court dismissed the
action.' 2 The court reasoned that, while the common practice in
New York was to construe the UCP's requirement of "reasonable
time" as meaning three banking days, Alaska Textile had
waived Chase Manhattan Bank's otherwise requisite compliance
with the UCP by submitting the documents on an approval
basis. 1
3
On December 28, 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed on different grounds. 4 The Second Cir-
cuit held that (1) Alaska Textile did not waive Chase Manhattan
Bank's compliance with the UCP, and (2) Chase Manhattan
Bank acted on Alaska Textile's demand within the reasonable
time mandated by article 16(c). Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase
period of UCC 5-112 is likely to be a reasonable time for the UCP).
8. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 821
(2d. Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 817.
10. Id. at 818. Article 16(c) of the UCP states that "[t]he issuing bank shall
have a reasonable time in which to examine the documents and to determine ...
whether to take up or to refuse the documents." U.C.P. art. 16(c) (1983) (emphasis
added). Once the issuer decides to either take up or to refuse the documents, it
must "without delay" provide notice of the discrepancies in the documents. U.C.P.
art. 16(d) (1983). The relevant portion of article 16(d) of the UCP provides:
If the issuing bank decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice
to that effect without delay, by telecommunication or, if that is not poss-
ible, by other expeditious means, to the bank from which it received the
documents (the remitting bank), or to the beneficiary, if it received the
documents directly from him.
U.C.P. art. 16(d) (1983) (emphasis added).
11. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
12. Alaska Textile Co, Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1139,
1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 821 (2d. Cir. 1992).
13. Id. at 1141.
14. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 982 F.2d 813, 815
(2d Cir. 1992).
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Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
It is against the backdrop of desired commercial assurances
that the Alaska Textile court, without providing adequate sup-
port for its rationale, raised unanticipated risks in the interna-
tional trade context by rejecting the three-day rule. The Second
Circuit's decision disrupted the parties' expectations, was con-
trary to the precedent of a number of U.S. jurisidictions, and
discounted the importance of an issuer's obligation as entirely
independent of the underlying transaction. As a result, the court
failed to place the loss on the best cost-avoider, the issuer.
This Case Comment demonstrates the impact of Alaska
Textile by exploring the operational rules governing letter of
credit transactions, the jurisprudence construing letter of credit
law, and the subsequent developments emanating from the deci-
sion.
II. PERSPECTIVE
The letter of credit 15 provides buyers and sellers with cer-
tainty in commercial transactions by replacing the face-to-face
sale with an exchange of documents." A commercial letter of
15. The origins of the law governing letters of credit have varied throughout
the world. See HENRY HARFIELD, LETTERS OF CREDIT 2-3 (1979). The legal frame-
work of letters of credit in Anglo-American jurisprudence stemmed from decisional
law. Id. In the United States, the rules governing documentary credit transactions
developed from landmark decisions rendered in the early part of the 20th century.
Id. Letters of credit in Latin America and Europe were recognized first by statute
and commercial code. See generally BORIS KOzOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF
CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 44, 58 (1966).
16. As an example, assume that a Venezuelan buyer wants to purchase goods
from a seller in the United States. The seller is concerned, in light of the distance
between them, with the buyer's credit-worthiness. At the same time, the buyer
wants assurance that the seller will deliver the goods.
Addressing these concerns, the seller (Beneficiary) requests the buyer (Cus-
tomer) to have his or her bank (Issuer) in Venezuela execute a letter of credit, with
a specific expiration date, in Beneficiary's favor. The credit requires that upon Benef-
iciary's delivery of goods to a shipper, accompanied by a precise presentation of
certain documents specified in the credit to its local bank, Beneficiary will receive
payment.
Beneficiary's local bank may be a confirming bank, an advising bank, or a
collecting bank. If the local bank is an advising bank, its obligation is to act as an
agent for Issuer and Customer and to give notice of the establishment of a credit in
Beneficiary's favor. If the local bank is a confirming bank, it is directly obligated on
the letter of credit, as if it were the issuer. The confirming bank pays Beneficiary
and forwards the documents to Issuer for reimbursement. If the local bank is a
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credit involves three independent legal relationships. 7 These
are the buyer and seller's underlying sales contract,18 a custo-
mer and issuer's agreement to execute a letter of credit, 9 and
an issuer and beneficiary's obligations under the letter of credit
itself.20
Perhaps the most unusual and commercially attractive fea-
ture of the three separate arrangements is that the issuer's duty
to pay the beneficiary is wholly independent of the underlying
sales contract.2' The reliability of the letter of credit is pre-
served through this independent duty because the issuer is con-
cerned only with documents, rather than the quality or fate of
the goods.22
Because the letter of credit is a private, legal arrangement,
its terms provide the primary source of law. In addition, the
parties can specifically incorporate trade usage, case law,24 and
collecting bank, the documents are typically collected and submitted for Customer's
approval, and are no longer subject to the letter of credit.
Regardless of which role the local bank plays, Customer ultimately reimburs-
es Issuer in Venezuela, in exchange for the documents which Beneficiary previously
presented. It is only with those documents that Customer can receive the goods
upon their arrival by carrier in his or her country.
The facts for this hypothetical are based on an example from HILLMAN, supra
note 5, at 3-4.
17. See generally Rev. U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 3 (1990).
18. See Henry Harfield, Who Does What to Whom: The Letter-of-Credit Mechan-
ism, 17 UCC L.J. 291, 293 (1985) (noting only seller and buyer are parties to that
contract).
19. Id.
20. Id. See generally Rsenblith, supra note 6, at 307-08 (discussing the inde-
pendent nature of three distinct agreements).
21. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 814
(2d Cir. 1992) (examining documents utterly independent of sales contract); Trudor
Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir.
1992) (resolving dispute regarding sales contract done with money in beneficiary's
hand); B.E.I. Intl., Inc. v. Thai Military Bank, 978 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1992)
(considering buyer-seller dispute outside of issuer's duty to pay); Ward Petroleum
Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 903 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring
documentary examination without reference to course of dealing or performance of
parties to underlying contract); see also Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 130 (noting
that the underlying purpose of issuer is to function as a neutral party to the sales
contract).
22. Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp.
1533, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); see
also Fama, Jr., supra note 1, at 1520 (stating that bank's role is to examine the
documents).
23. See generally Harfield, supra note 18, at 294 (describing letters of credit as
creatures of contract).
24. A great body of case law, which can be used by analogy, exists in Great
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other law to govern their transaction.25 No explicit conflict
rules exist, however, on letter of credit choice of law issues.26
In light of the increased use of letters of credit,27 uniform-
ity in international letter of credit law is essential. 2 Two major
sets of rules govern or supplement letter of credit transactions,
the UCP 29 and the UCC.
30
A. The Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits
1. Background
The UCP details operations for letter of credit transactions,
and is applied in more than 160 countries,3' including the
United States, Hungary, Ghana, Japan, Fiji, and Uruguay. 2
This worldwide usage illustrates that the UCP is the primary
guide to letter of credit transactions.33 The majority of parties
adhering to the UCP make specific reference to it in their inter-
Britain. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 19-3, at 822.
25. See id. § 19-3, at 818.
26. Id. § 19-3, at 822-23; see also Roger J. Gewolb, The Law Applicable to
International Letters of Credit, 11 VILL. L. REV. 742, 753 (1966).
27. Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C.
Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAw. 1521, 1531 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force
Report] (noting unprecedented expansion in use of letters of credit). More letters of
credit are written in New York than in any other state, a large share being interna-
tional. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 19-3, at 822; James E. Byrne, The
Revision of U.C.C. Article 5: A Strategy for Success, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 26
(1990).
For example, a court used a letter of credit to ensure that a child would be
returned by his father in Germany to his mother in Minnesota pursuant to a cus-
tody agreement following the parents' divorce. Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321
N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
28. JEAN STOUFFLET, LE CRIkDIT DOCUMENTAIRE 91 (1957) ("Si l'on tente de
caractriser le Droit du credit documentaire, il apparait que sa profende tendance A
l'unit6 internationale en est le trait essentiel.") (emphasis in original) (If one
endeavors to characterize the law of the documentary credit, it appears the profound
tendency toward international unity is essential in the future).
29. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (International Chamber of Commerce Publi-
cation No. 400, 1983).
30. Rev. U.C.C. art. 5 (1990).
31. See generally Busto, supra note 6, at 299 (indicating worldwide participa-
tion).
32. See Worldwide List of Countries, Banks Adhering to UCP, LETTER OF
CREDIT UPDATE, Dec. 1990, at 29-37.
33. Id. at 29.
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national letters of credit.34 In so doing, the guidelines of the
UCP become terms of the letter of credit, in the same fashion as
the express terms.35
The UCP is neither a statute nor a code; 36 it is a document
that reflects custom.3 7 The rules are the result of the joint
efforts of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 38 the
United Nations, and the banking community, to unify banking
custom in letter of credit law.39 The UCP also provides a mech-
anism for international banking lawyers to become acquainted
with the method of current letter of credit practice.4"
The need to formulate a uniform approach with respect to
letters of credit stemmed from the uncertainty of the economy
following World War II.4' The ICC published the UCP for the
first time in 193342 and, in response to changes in international
trade,43 the ICC amended the UCP in 1983.44
34. See U.C.P. art. 1 (1983); see Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 139.
35. HARFIELD, supra note 15, at 3.
36. Mark A. Wayne, The Uniform Customs and Practice as a Source of Docu-
mentary Credit Law in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain: A Comparison
of Application and Interpretation, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 148 (1989).
37. See Henry Harfield, An Agnostic View, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990)
(noting that the UCP mixes rules with custom, but is clearly not law); see also
HARFIELD, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that the UCP is custom not law).
38. The ICC is a private organization located in Paris, France. Rubenstein,
supra note 3, at 138.
39. See KOzOLCHYK, supra note 15, at 83-84.
40. See Wayne, supra note 36, at 150.
41. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO DOCUMENTARY
CREDIT OPERATIONS: INCLUDING UNIFORM CUSTOM AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY
CREDITS 41 (International Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 415, 1985). The
ICC undertook the task of combining bankers' varying perceptions of letter of credit
transactions and creating a consistent authority. See KOZOLCHYK, supra note 15, at
84.
42. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (International Chamber of Commerce Bro-
chure No. 82, 1933), revised by INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (International
Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 222, 1951), revised by INTERNATIONAL CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMEN-
TARY CREDITS (International Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 290, 1974)
revised by INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (International Chamber of Commerce Publi-
cation No. 400, 1983).
43. See FRANS P. DE ROOY, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 12 (1984) (noting that the
UCP was updated to stay in line with developments); JAN C. DEKKER, CASE. STUDIES
ON DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 9 (International Chamber of Commerce Publication No.
459. 1989) (noting continuing revolution in transport technology, communications, and
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2. UCP Article 16
UCP article 16(c) allows the issuer a "reasonable" time with-
in which to honor the credit or to notify the presenter of the
reasons for dishonoring the documents.4" If the issuer fails to
comply with the timely notice provisions of the UCP, article
16(e) precludes the issuer from claiming that the documents are
nonconforming.46 The issuer is estopped irrespective of any det-
rimental reliance by the beneficiary.47 Once the issuer has lost
its right to claim that the documents are nonconforming, it is
deemed to have honored the documents, mandating payment
under the letter of credit to the beneficiary.4"
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
1. Background
In the United States, article 5 of the UCC also sets forth
letter of credit rules.4" In many ways, article 5 is a statutory
analogue of the UCP.50 However, the source of the UCC's letter
of credit law stems from contract law, rather than custom.5 '
international trade).
44. See DE ROOY, supra note 43, at 12. The ICC agreed to the 1983 revision,
effective October 1984, after considering input from the United Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law. Id. The 1983 UCP is an interesting change because the 1974
version required that a bank only give notice of dishonor of a letter of credit to the
verifying bank. See Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 159. The 1983 revision instead
requires the bank to notify the beneficiary of dishonor directly to avoid the penalty
provided for in 16(e). Id.
45. U.C.P. art. 16(c) (1983).
46. U.C.P. art. 16(e) (1983).
47. See generally Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 872
F.2d 971, 974 (11th Cir. 1989); Kuntal, S.A. v. Bank of New York, 703 F. Supp.
312, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); James G. Barnes, Nonconforming Presentations Under
Letters of Credit: Preclusion and Final Payment, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 103, 103 (1990).
48. U.C.P. art. 16(e) (1983).
49. Rev. U.C.C. art. 5 (1990).
50. See HARFIELD, supra note 15, at 4; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 19-
11, at 881 (finding UCC and UCP complementary). The drafters of the UCC
intended the code to stress system, order, and logic to facilitate the business com-
munity. See generally WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CEN-
TENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 78 (1991).
51. See Rev. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. 1 (1990). The New York Court of Appeals has
described article 5 as a codification of law. See United Bank, Ltd. v. Cambridge
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The drafters of the UCC based the statute, in part, on the
concept that uniformity and certainty in applicable law enhances
commercial transactions.52 Specifically, they intended article 5
to create an independent legal framework for further develop-
ment of the law.53 Accordingly, the official comments to the
UCC instruct that article 5 be read liberally to promote those
underlying policies. 54
Despite these goals, the banking community has criticized
the ineffectiveness of the UCC's article 5.55 Bankers wanted an
international customary set of rules to solve ordinary problems
associated with letters of credit, rather than article 5's codifica-
tion of the atypical, relatively rare cases.5" Conversely, com-
mercial lawyers endorsed article 5, while noting that bankers
were only seeking to maximize banking discretion."
A UCC Task Force is now vigorously examining article 5 to
determine the adequacy of letter of credit law in the United
States.58 One of the most notable problems with article 5 stems
from the drafters' failure to grasp the significance of the UCP's
well-established articulation of letter of credit rule-making and
custom.
5 9
Four states, including New York, have specifically expressed
disfavor with the UCC. 0 In those states, article 5 contains a
nonuniform section 5-102(4)61 which provides that article 5 has
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254 (1976); Task Force Report, supra note 27, at
1531 (describing article 5 as codification of case law).
52. Marrianne B. Culhane, The UCC Revision Process: Legislation You Should
See in the Making, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 29 (1992).
53. Rev. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. 1 (1990).
54. Id. § 5-102 cmt. 2.
55. See Byrne, supra note 27, at 24.
56. Id.
57. Id. (noting the disdain between the legal and banking communities).
58. See Task Force Report, supra note 27, at 1531-44.
59. Byrne, supra note 27, at 17.
60. See HILLMAN, supra note 5, at 7.
61. For example, New York's section 5-102(4) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of
credit if by its terms or by agreement, course of dealing or usage of
trade such letter of credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth or
by any subsequent Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce.
N.Y.U.C.C. LAW § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1984). This provision was also adopted in
Alabama, Arizona, and Missouri. See ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47-5-102(4) (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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no application where a letter of credit is subject in whole or part,
to the UCP. 2 Despite this provision, however, courts in New
York and elsewhere have held that, where the UCP is silent or
ambiguous, parties may resort to analogous UCC sections.
2. UCC Section 5-112
Under UCC section 5-112, an issuer has three banking days
within which to honor a letter of credit.' If the issuer does not
honor within the specified time, it is deemed to have dishonored
the letter of credit.65 The issuer must advise the presenter that
the documents are being held for the presenter or must return
the documents, but need not specify reasons for dishonor.6
The issuer may raise the documents' nonconformities as a
defense in a beneficiary's suit for wrongful dishonor.6 Where
the documents fail to conform to the letter of credit's terms, the
beneficiary should prevail if it can show the traditional elements
for estoppel. 8
62. See HILLMAN, supra note 5, at 7.
63. See United Bank, Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254
(1976); Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urunleri Dis Ticaret Ve
Sanayi, A.S., 748 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying UCC by analogy to
credit subject to UCP); Prutscher v. Fidelity Int'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (authorizing application of UCC to a UCP letter of credit); Bank of Cochin,
Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(utilizing Code by analogy), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986);
Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Intl Banking Corp.
787 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (S.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992); see
also Rosenblith, supra note 6, at 309. But see Fertico Belgium, S.A. v. Phosphate
Chem. Export Ass'n, 473 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1st Dept. 1984) (subjecting credit to
UCP makes UCC inapplicable); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 19-1, at 807 n.3
(stating that UCP complements UCC, but sometimes displaces it).
64. Section 5-112(1) of the UCC provides:
(1) A bank to which a . .. demand for payment is presented under a
credit may without dishonor ...
(a) defer honor until the close of the third banking day following
receipt of the documents; and
(b) further defer honor if the presenter has expressly or impliedly
consented thereto.
Failure to honor within the time here specified constitutes dishonor ...
of the credit.
Rev. U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a), (b) (1990).
65. Id. § 5-112(1)(b).
66. See Barnes, supra note 47, at 104 (explaining process for dishonor).
67. Id.
68. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 4.06 [2] [c], at 4-30
(2d ed. 1991). The elements of estoppel include change of position of the parties so
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C. Letter of Credit Jurisprudence
Much of the case law construing the interplay between the
UCC and UCP in international letter of credit litigation holds
that three days represent the typical time within which an
issuer must review documents to notify the beneficiary of honor
or dishonor. Further, the issuer's period for giving notice does
not vary with the usefulness of such notice. Finally, an issuer's
consultation with its customer regarding waiver of documentary
discrepancies does not enlarge the timely notice provisions under
the UCP.
1. The Three-Day Rule of Thumb: Bank of Cochin v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
In Bank of Cochin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,69
Vishwa Niryat Ltd. (Customer) requested Bank of Cochin
Limited (Issuer), an Indian corporation, to issue a letter of credit
covering up to $798,000 for the purchase of aluminum scrap, for
the benefit of St. Lucia Enterprises, Ltd. (Beneficiary).7" The
1974 revision of the UCP 7 controlled the letter of credit which
had an expiration date of April 15, 1980.72
Beneficiary allegedly shipped the aluminum on May 29,
that the party against whom estoppel is being invoked received a benefit, or that
the party invoking the doctrine relied to its detriment. See generally Amwest Sur.
Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 977 F.2d 122, 127 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
69. 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the case, see David L. Tank, Comment, Bank of
Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust. "Quasi-Strict" Compliance of
Documents, Issuer's "Supervisory Core," and "Reasonable Delay" Under Letters of
Credit, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 535, 556-59 (1987).
70. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1534.
71. The court explained that application of the 1983 UCP would favor Confirm-
ing Bank, but would not alter the result of the case. Id. at 1534 n.3. The 1974
version of the UCP read in relevant part:
d) The issuing bank shall have a reasonable time to examine the docu-
ments and to determine as above whether to make such a claim.
e) If such claim is to be made, notice to that effect, stating the reasons
therefore, must, without delay, be given by cable or other expeditious
means to the bank from which the documents have been received . ...
72. Id. at 1534.
[Vol. 25:2330
SECOND CIRCUIT RAISES RISKS
1980, from West Germany to Bombay, India.'3 On June 9,
1980, Beneficiary presented the documents required by the let-
ter of credit to Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company (Con-
firming Bank).'4 Confirming Bank reviewed the documents,
found them to be conforming, and on June 13, 1980, paid Benefi-
ciary. 5
Issuer immediately reimbursed Confirming Bank, but did
not receive the documents until June 21, 1980.76 Unfortunately,
Beneficiary, who disappeared after receiving payment, shipped
nothing to Customer. The documents were fraudulent in every
regard.v By telex dated July 3, 1980, Issuer asked Confirming
Bank to recredit its account and advised Confirming Bank that
it was returning the documents.78
Confirming Bank responded by telex of July 14, 1980 that
Issuer had failed to timely specify documentary discrepancies as
required by the UCP.79 On July 9, 1985, Issuer sued Confirm-
ing Bank in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York for wrongful honor of letter of credit.8 0 The district
court granted Confirming Bank's motion for summary judgment,
holding that failure to notify Confirming Bank within the rea-
sonable time required by the UCP estopped Issuer from assert-
ing the discrepancies in the letter of credit.8 '
The court reasoned that, while the UCP did not specify
what constituted a reasonable time for an issuer to determine if
documents are defective, the court could use analogous and
consistent UCC provisions where the UCP was silent or ambigu-
ous. 2 Because the UCC provided for a period of three banking
days, that time was the maximum allowable for Issuer in Bank
73. Id. at 1535.
74. Id. Among the required documents were signed invoices, bills of lading,
notification of shipment, maritime insurance, and a certificate confirming the quality
and quantity of scrap metal. Id. at 1534 n.1.
75. Bank of Cochin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533,
1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
76. Id.
77. Id. The bills of lading and quality certifications were issued by nonexistent
corporations. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1533.
81. Bank of Cochin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 1542.
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of Cochin to notify Confirming Bank whether the documents
were being honored or rejected.83 Accordingly, Issuer's failure
to notify Confirming Bank of its decision to dishonor for over a
week beyond three days-which potentially prevented Confirm-
ing Bank and Issuer from curing the defects prior to the letter of
credit's expiration-precluded Issuer's recovery.8
4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
lower court's ruling with a similar rationale, but on different
grounds.85 The twelve or thirteen-day period from Issuer's ini-
tial inspection of the documents under the letter of credit to its
notification of the defects was a failure to act without delay.86
Thus, the court did not need to decide whether it should read
the UCC's three-day time frame into the UCP's reasonable time
requirement. v The court of appeals concluded that the UCP
effected the fundamental policy of promoting certainty in com-
mercial transactions.8 8
2. The Usefulness of the Notice Is Immaterial: Bank De L'Union
Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking Corp.
In Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Int'l Banking Corp.,89 Banque De L'Union Haitienne
(Issuer) on March 3, 1989, issued a letter of credit at the request
of Eleck S.A. (Customer), for the benefit of International Basic
Economic Co. (Beneficiary).90 The letter of credit was subject to
the UCP, and was to expire on April 30, 1989. 91
On April 24, 1989, Beneficiary presented its documents to
Manufacturers Hanover International Banking Corporation
(Confirming Bank).9 2 Confirming Bank ultimately found the
documents conforming, transferred $1,473,189 to Beneficiary's
83. Id. at 1542-43.
84. Id. at 1543.
85. Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209,
213 (2d Cir. 1986); Tank, supra note 69, at 558.
86. Cochin, 808 F.2d at 213.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking
Corp., 787 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992).
90. Banque De L'Union Haitienne, 787 F. Supp. at 1418.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1419.
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account in Miami, Florida, and debited Issuer's account for that
same amount.93 On the following day, Beneficiary wire trans-
ferred the money overseas and disappeared.94 On or about
April 27, 1989, Confirming Bank forwarded the documents to
Issuer.95 On May 8, 1989, Issuer notified Confirming Bank by
telex that the documents were nonconforming and that it was
seeking repayment from Confirming Bank."
On February 27, 1991, Issuer sued Confirming Bank in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida for
improper payment on an international letter of credit.9 7 The
district court granted Confirming Bank's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Issuer's violation of the timely notice
provisions of the UCP prevented recovery.98
The district court reasoned that, while Issuer was in receipt
of the nonconforming documents three days prior to the letter of
credit's expiry, it unjustifiably failed to give notice of dishonor to
Confirming Bank until eight days after the expiration date.99
Accordingly, Issuer violated the rationale set forth in Bank of
Cochin, °00 which provided that the UCC's three-day rule
should be the maximum reasonable time under the UCP.1°0
The court concluded that one of the purposes of the UCP's
timely notice provisions was to give a beneficiary the opportun-
ity to cure defects prior to the expiration of the letter of
credit.10'2 However, the fact that the defects could not have
been cured in this case did not excuse Issuer's obligation to give
timely notice because Issuer's duty to provide prompt notice was
in no way connected with the usefulness of such notice.'0 3
Rather, the UCP's timeliness requirements served as rules of
traffic, enforcing certainty and integrity in international letter of
93. Id.
94. Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Int'l Banking Corp.,
787 F. Supp. 1416, 1419 (S.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1416.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1421.
100. 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1986).
101. Banque De LUnion Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Intl Banking Corp.,
787 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (S.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992).
102. Id. at 1422-23.
103. Id. at 1423.
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credit commerce. 10 4
3. The Impropriety of Considering Customer's Potential Waiver
in Determining the Time for Issuer to Act: Bankers Trust Co. v.
State Bank of India
In Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India,"°5 Bankers
Trust Co. (Issuer) issued a letter of credit in favor of the Steel
Authority of India (Beneficiary), at the request of Harlow &
Jones, Limited (Customer).1' The letter of credit was subject
to the 1983 revision of the UCP.
10 7
On September 3, 1988, Beneficiary shipped four consign-
ments of steel from India to Customer.' On September 9,
1988, Beneficiary presented to State Bank of India (Confirming
Bank) more than 967 documents purporting to comply with the
letter of credit's terms. 09 Confirming Bank paid Beneficiary
upon presentment and forwarded the documents to Issuer. 10
On September 14, 1988, Issuer reimbursed Confirming Bank,
but prior to receipt and review of the mailed documents."'
Issuer received the documents in London on September 12,
1988 and found several discrepancies."' Rather than provide
notice of the nonconformities to Beneficiary or Confirming Bank,
Issuer on September 26, 1988 forwarded the documents to Cus-
tomer, who discovered more discrepancies." 3 After Customer
refused to waive the nonconformities, Issuer on September 30,
1988, by telex to Confirming Bank, rejected the documents and
demanded repayment.14 Confirming Bank refused to reim-
burse Issuer claiming that Issuer's rejection was entirely in
104. Id. at 1424.
105. [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 587 (Q.B.), appeal dismissed, [1991] 2 Lloyds Rep.
443 (C.A.).
106. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, 11991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 587, 589
(Q.B.).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 587, 589
(Q.B.).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 590.
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violation of UCP article 16.15
On December 29, 1988, Issuer sued Confirming Bank for
wrongfully honoring Beneficiary's nonconforming docu-
ments.116 The court ruled in favor of Confirming Bank, reason-
ing that Issuer exceeded a reasonable time in examining the
documents and failed to determine on the basis of the docu-
ments alone whether the documents conformed to the letter of
credit. 1
17
On June 13, 1991, the English Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's ruling, finding eight days to be an unreason-
able time for Issuer's document examination. 118 The court rea-
soned that a bank of Issuer's sophistication could finish review
in substantially less time than it actually took."9
The appeals court stated that the customary banking prac-
tice in the United Kingdom, and the position taken by the ICC
Banking Commission, was to fix three days as the reasonable
time under UCP's article 16.120 Further, in the United States,
the UCC explicitly provided for a three-banking-day rule.
12
Accordingly, Issuer had violated both the spirit of the UCP and
the letter of the UCC.
122
The court concluded by emphasizing that the UCP restricted
Issuer's examination to the face of documents. 23 As such, a
reasonable time for Issuer could not be extended to allow for
Customer's potential waiver of the documents' discrepancies.
124
115. Id.
116. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 587, 590
(Q.B.).
117. Id. at 588.
118. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443, 444
(C.A.).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 448.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443, 451
(C.A.).
124. Id. at 452.
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III. ALASKA TEXTILE CO., INC. V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
N.A.: RAISING UNANTICIPATED RISKS FOR LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Facts
Alaska Textile, a New York-based company, exports fabric
from India. 2 ' In early 1988, Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., a
women's clothing manufacturer, contracted to purchase silk from
Alaska Textile's Indian location for delivery and use in the
buyer's Hong Kong-based operation.'26
At Lloyd Williams Fashions' request, Chase Manhattan
Bank issued two letters of credit in Alaska Textile's favor for
$82,500 and $47,141.25.127 On April 2, 1988, Alaska Textile
shipped the fabric from India to Hong Kong, pursuant to Lloyd
Williams Fashions' order, but did not present the documents
under the letters of credit to Merchants Bank of New York
128
until April 26, 1988.129 While reviewing the documents for sub-
mission to Chase Manhattan Bank, Merchants Bank's examiner
found the documents to be untimely 3 ° and nonconforming.' 3'
Alaska Textile acknowledged its noncompliance with the
letter of credits' terms, but it nevertheless directed Merchants
Bank to forward the documents to Chase Manhattan Bank.
13 2
On April 27, 1988, Merchants Bank presented the documents
"on an approval basis," 13 to indicate that Alaska Textile was
125. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co., Inc.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
126. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
127. 777 F. Supp. at 1140.
128. Merchants Bank of New York, in its capacity as a "collecting bank," acted
as an agent of the seller of goods for purposes of presenting the documents and
receiving payment.
129. Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 817.
130. Because they were presented more than twenty-one days after the date that
Beneficiary shipped the goods, Collecting Bank considered the documents to be incur-
ably "stale." Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 817. For timing rules, see U.C.P. arts. 46-
49, 51-53 (1983).
131. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
132. Id.
133. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co., Inc.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
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requesting Chase Manhattan Bank to have Lloyd Williams
Fashions waive the discrepancies and authorize payment.
13 4
Chase Manhattan Bank reviewed the documents under the two
letters of credit on the third and fourth banking days following
Merchants Bank's presentment. 135 While Chase Manhattan
Bank discovered discrepancies which would justify immediate
dishonor, 136 it asked Lloyd Williams Fashions whether it
would waive the nonconformities. 37
On May 9, 1988, eight banking days after Merchants Bank's
presentment, Chase Manhattan Bank told Merchants Bank that
the discrepancies warranted dishonor, but that Lloyd Williams
Fashions remained undecided as to the question of waiver.
31
On May 18, 1988, fifteen banking days after presentment, Chase
Manhattan Bank formally dishonored the letters of credit, by
way of telecommunication to Merchants Bank.
139
B. The Court's Analysis
1. Documents on Collection
The unanimous court began its analysis by discussing two
points of agreement between the district court and the parties.
First, Alaska Textile's (Beneficiary) submission of documents on
an approval basis meant that the documents were
nonconforming. Second, Beneficiary requested Chase Manhattan
Bank (Issuer) to ask Lloyd Williams Fashions (Customer) to
waive the discrepancies 4 ° and authorize Issuer's payment on
134. Id.
135. Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 817.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co., Inc.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1992).
140. The UCP does not preclude an issuer from notifying its customer of a
nonconforming presentation, but the issuer must dishonor promptly. See Vincent M.
Maulella, UCP Art. 16 Proposal on Notifying the Applicant, LETTER OF CREDIT
UPDATE, April 1991, at 6. There are some practical reasons for allowing issuers to
seek their customer's waiver of nonconformities. For example issuing banks in the
United States indicate that at least 50% of documentary submissions are
nonconforming. Id. Soviet commentators contend that where documents fail to con-
form to credit terms, the issuer should not be permitted to seek a waiver of the
discrepancies from its customer because of the nation's need to prove itself as reli-
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the letter of credit.' The legal implications of submitting the
documents on approval presented the court with an issue of first
impression.' The court noted the lack of authority on the
matter, and summarily analogized presentment of documents on
approval with presentment of documents "on collection.' 43
The court explained that submitting documents on collection
could mean two different things.' First, the term could mean,
as the court found in Alaska Textile, that Beneficiary submitted
documents subject to the letter of credit and the UCP, but with
a request that Issuer ask Customer to waive the documents'
nonconformities"' Alternatively, presentation on collection
could mean the documents were being sent on a basis indepen-
dent of the letter of credit and, therefore, subject to the Uniform
Rules for Collections.'
46
2. Criticism of the Court's Documents on Collection Analysis
The ICC, which drafted, revised, and implemented the UCP,
stated that the handling of documents on a collection basis obvi-
ates the issuer's obligation to advise the beneficiary of discrep-
ancies. 14' The issuer's duty on collection would be limited to
the transition of the documents for discretionary collecting and
payment by its customer.' 48 Therefore, contrary to the court's
finding, Issuer could not have been acting on collection because
Issuer's own apparent belief that it had a duty to give notice of
able in international trade. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., Letters of Credit in East-
West Trade: Soviet Reception of Capitalist Custom, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329,
363 (1984).
141. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 818-19.
146. This would be the case if the bank were acting solely as its customer's
agent. Id.
147. See generally Rheinberg Kellerei GmbH v. Brookfield Nat'l Bank of Com-
merce Bank, 901 F.2d 481, 481 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring collecting bank to notify
issuing bank without delay); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM
RULES FOR COLLECTIONS art. (B)(i) (International Chamber of Commerce Publication
No. 322, 1978) (defining collection as handling documents for acceptance or rejection
upon instructions received).
148. See generally Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 717 n.4 (1976) (acting as an agent); Beef Neb. Inc. v. United States Dept. of
Agr., 807 F.2d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1986) (handling documents only for collection).
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the documents' discrepancies to Merchants Bank (Collecting
Bank) on May 9, 1988149 belies the argument. Further, under
the ICC's definition of presentation on collection,6 ° the court
could not logically conclude that Issuer was both acting on a col-
lection basis and bound by the UCP, because article 16(c)
requires an issuer to notify a beneficiary of nonconformities."5 '
Finally, the court failed to explain why or how documents pres-
ented on approval amount to the "functional equivalent"'52 of
documents submitted on collection.
3. A "Reasonable Time" for Dishonor
Despite its inconsistent logic with respect to documents
submitted on collection, the court appropriately determined that
Beneficiary's submission of documents on an approval basis did
not vitiate Issuer's obligations, under the UCP, to advise of dis-
crepancies in a timely fashion. 5 3 Having dispensed with the
arguments that Issuer was not bound to strictly comply with the
UCP, the Second Circuit proceeded to determine whether article
16's requirements were met.154
The court explained that under article 16(c), an issuer has a
reasonable time within which to accept or refuse a beneficiary's
documents.'55 Further, an issuer's failure to act within the rea-
sonable time would render the documents honored under article
16(e). 156
The court next emphatically rejected Beneficiary's conten-
tion that Issuer had a maximum of three days to dishonor, as
149. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
150. See Rheinberg Kellerei GmbH v. Brooksfield Nat'l Bank of Commerce Bank,
901 F.2d 481, 481 (5th Cir. 1990).
151. See U.C.P. art. 16(c) (1983).
152. Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 818.
153. Id. at 819.
154. Id. at 820.
155. Id.
156. Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 820 (2d
Cir. 1992). Article 16(e) states:
If the issuing bank failed to act in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Article and/or fails to hold the documents
at the disposal of, or to return them to the presentor, the issuing bank
shall be precluded from claiming that the documents are not in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of the credit.
U.C.P. art. 16(e) (1983).
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set forth in UCC 5-112(1). 117 The Alaska Textile court acknowl-
edged that the UCC could supplement unclear or silent provi-
sions of the UCP,'58 but reasoned that article 16(c)'s reason-
able time, while imprecise, was not ambiguous, and could be
determined from the nature and circumstances of the situ-
ation." 9 The Second Circuit found that a reasonable time was
a fluid concept dependent upon the factual scenario of each
case. 160
4. Criticism of the Court's "Reasonable Time" Analysis
The holding defeats the parties' expectations, is contrary to
the majority precedent, and disrupts the parties' risk allocation.
a. Meeting the Parties' Expectations
As the court stated, certainty is the hallmark of the letter of
credit. 161 This concept rests upon objective, practicable stan-
dards.'62 In the international financial community and under
the UCP, this means that a beneficiary is assured payment
unless the issuer communicates prompt dishonor, in line with
the parties' expectations.
163
Furthermore, commercial and banking law have long associ-
ations with standards of good faith'6 and due diligence. When
157. Alaska Textile, 982 F.2d at 821.
158. Id. at 822.
159. Id. at 823-24.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 815.
162. See generally Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.R.L. v. Compania Anonina
Venozolana De Navegaci6n, 765 F.2d 1306, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1985); Boris Kozolchyk,
Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 78
(1990) (noting global financial market place requires uniform operating guidelines).
163. See Robert M. Rosenblith, Lawyer Robert M. Rosenblith Looks at UCC Pro-
visions Against UCP Rule, 6 LETTER OF CREDIT UPDATE, Feb. 1990, at 11, 11-12;
Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1543
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expecting parties to live up to their obligations), affd on other
grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); Harfield, supra note 18, at 295; see generally
Tank, supra note 69, at 542 (noting that drawing bright lines promotes certainty).
164. See generally TransAmerica Delaval, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 545 F. Supp.
200, 205 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (issuer owes duty of good faith to beneficiary); Occiden-
tal Fire & Casualty v. Continental Bank, N. A., 918 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990)
(requiring of banks general obligation of good faith in commercial settings); Robert
M. Rosenblith, Letter-of-Credit Practice: Revisiting Ongoing Problems, 24 UCC L.J.
120, 126-27 (1991) (imposing duties of good faith and reasonable care).
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a customer chooses a sophisticated bank as the issuer," 5 the
law could require the bank to rise above those standards. There-
fore, a beneficiary should expect a bank diligently and properly
running a letter of credit operation to pay or claim defects in no
more than three days.'66 To conclude otherwise, eviscerates
the parties' expectations and violates the UCP.
b. Precedent Demonstrates that Three Days Are Reasonable
As the district court in Alaska Textile found, it is common
New York banking practice to construe article 16(c)'s timing
requirement to mean three banking days.6 ' Three days is also
the standard applied by most courts throughout the United
States. 168
Courts follow the three-day rule because it is an adequate
165. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 815
(2d Cir. 1992).
166. Rosenblith, supra note 163, at 12 (noting that needing more than three
days indicates issuer's lack of sophistication).
167. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1141; (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co.,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); Bank of
Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F.Supp. 1533, 1539 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding three days the maximum allowable time), affd on other grounds, 808
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); see generally Rosenblith, supra note 6, at 330.
168. See Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l
Banking Corp., 787 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting three days typically
the maximum), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992); Occidental Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 918 F.2d 1312, 1318 at n.3 (7th Cir.
1990) (interpreting UCC three-day rule as harmonious with UCP reasonable time);
Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.R.L. v. Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegaci6n,
765 F.2d 1306, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no conflict between UCC three-day,
and UCP, reasonable time); Integrated Measurement Sys., Inc. v. International Com-
mercial Bank of China, 757 F. Supp. 938, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding ten days too
late under Article 16); Petra Int'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 758 F. Supp.
1120, 1128 (E.D. Va. 1991) (giving notice one year late far too long), affd, 953 F.2d
1383 (4th Cir. 1992); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. City Nat'l Bank, 17 UCC Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (delaying one year too long); Crocker
Commercial Serv., Inv. v. Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp. 1360, 1363-64 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (approaching credit's expiry could shorten three-day rule); AmSouth Bank, NA.
v. Martin, 559 So. 2d 1058, 1065 (Ala. 1990) (noting UCC's 5-112 could supersede
UCP's reasonable time); Busto, supra note 6, at 303 (noting United States courts use
the three-day rule); Task Force Report, supra note 27, at 1600 (indicating courts
bridge UCP reasonable time to UCC three-day time). But compare a Polish
professor's view that a strict interpretation of letter of credit laws makes commercial
transactions inflexible. See generally A. Szpunar, Przedawnienie Roszcen Wekslowych,
45 PRZEG STAW GoSPAD no. 93-98 (1992) (Pol.).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
period for the issuing bank to complete its limited obligation of
documentary review. Further, where an issuer gives notice with-
in three days, a beneficiary will usually have time to cure docu-
mentary defects before the letter of credit expires.'69 A delayed
notice could impair the beneficiary's ability to mitigate
losses. 70 But as articulated in Banque De L'Union Haitienne,
even where documents are incurable, courts still prefer the time-
ly notice requirement 171 to maintain commercial stability. Also,
an issuer is not permitted to defend its delayed communication
to a beneficiary on grounds that it sought a waiver from the
customer.
In Alaska Textile, Beneficiary specifically notified Issuer of
the documents' discrepancies. 72 Arguably, Issuer's task of
reviewing the documents for nonconformities was, therefore,
made easier, perhaps shortening the typical three days within
which banks must examine documents. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit's definition of a "reasonable time" was contrary to the
purpose of letters of credit and the majority of precedent articu-
lating the rules.
c. Risk Allocation and the Independence Doctrine
The court's standard of reasonableness also abrogated the
independence principle fundamental to letters of credit and
disrupted the parties' risk allocation. It is well established that
any request by an issuer for waiver by its customer is indepen-
dent of its obligation to give timely notice to a beneficiary under
article 16(c).' 73
169. Rosenblith, supra note 4, at 90.
170. See generally Rosenblith, supra note 163, at 12 (timing is critical for divert-
ing goods in transit).
171. Banque De L'Union Haitienne, S.A. v. Manufacturers Hanover Int'l Banking
Corp., 787 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting incurability as bearing on
notice requirement), affd, 959 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1992); Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (failing
to notify not excused by incurability), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.
1986); Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680, 684-85 (2d
Cir. 1983) (noting usefulness of notice immaterial); Pro-Fab Inc. v. Vipa, Inc., 772
F.2d 847, 854 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting "usefulness of notice" contention).
172. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
173. See Rosenblith, supra note 4, at 89 (explaining waiver outside of the credit);
see also Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d 780, 786 (2d Cir. 1991) (obligating issuer
to pay independent of other claims); All Service Exportaqao Impoctaqao Commercio,
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In a recent case17 on facts similar to Alaska Textile, 17
the English Court of Appeals in Banker's Trust explained, "[a]
reasonable time for the bank to examine the documents cannot
be extended by a further period of time to enable the customer
to examine the documents. " 176 Under a similar rationale, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Bank of
Cochin177 that the reasonable time does not include a period
for the issuer and customer to "ride the market." 78 Therefore,
Beneficiary's mere act of asking Collecting Bank to present docu-
ments on approval 179 could not have vitiated or altered Issuer's
independent obligation for prompt notice under the UCP.
Even if the court's facts and circumstances test for a reason-
able time for dishonor were appropriate, the risk should have
fallen on the best cost-avoider. A letter of credit is one item on a
menu of services banks offer in order to induce beneficiaries and
customers to rely on it as their financial institution. While no
consideration is required to establish a letter of credit, banks
understandably include commissions and other customary
charges in their customer reimbursement agreements. 8 ' The
court would have more properly placed the risk on the issuer
who uses letters of credit as a method to attract and build busi-
ness, and who should be familiar with the services it offers and
charges.
Courts typically apply general contract principals to letter of
credit transactions.'' When faced with ambiguity, courts con-
strue letters of credit as strongly as reasonably possible against
S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus Do Brasil, S.A., 921 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1990) (distin-
guishing issuer's duty to beneficiary from duty to customer).
174. Bankers Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [19911 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443, 449
(C.A).
175. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
176. See Banker's Trust Co. v. State Bank of India, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443,
449 (CA.).
177. 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
178. Id. at 212.
179. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 118
(2d Cir. 1992).
180. See BURTON V. MCCULLOUGH, LETTERS OF CREDIT § 3.06[11] (1993). Custom-
ary charges for items such as cable fees are as low as one percent of the amount of
the letter of credit, and commissions are typically .25%. Id. It is a letter of credit's
low expense that make the financing device an attractive service for a bank to offer
to its customers. Id.
181. See Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
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the issuer.1 2 In Alaska Textile, no facts suggest that the
parties provided an express term in their private agreements to
indicate the time within which Issuer had to review the docu-
ments.8 3 The parties did incorporate the UCP by specific ref-
erence,8 4 however, so that its guidelines became terms of the
letters of credit, in the same manner as the express terms
did.18
5
Because the Second Circuit was unwilling to apply the UCC
three-day rule, it should have at least construed a "reasonable
time" against the Issuer. Under that approach, it would be
unfair for the court to place the burden on Beneficiary, where
Issuer failed to notify Beneficiary of dishonor until fifteen days
after presentment.1
86
5. Consequence of Dishonor and Bastardizing the UCP
The Second Circuit court in Alaska Textile went on to assert
that the UCC and the UCP were incompatible because the
bodies of law had two radically different approaches to the con-
sequences of dishonoring a letter of credit.8
7
The court further stated that the imposition of the UCC's
three-day rule into the UCP's reasonable time was unacceptable,
because UCC section 5-112(1)(b) authorized relaxation of the
three-day rule when the parties consent. 18 Therefore, the rea-
ding of a strict three-day rule into the UCP would resemble nei-
ther authority, with the effect of "bastardizing" them both. 89
182. See Bank of China v. Chan, 937 F.2d 780, 786 (2d Cir. 1991) (interpreting
ambiguities against bank); Barclay Knitwear, Inc. v. Kingswear Ent. Ltd., 533
N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (construing letter of credit against issuer so
that beneficiary can comply); Banco Espafiol de Crddito v. Bank & Trust Co., 385
F.2d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968) (reading credit
against the drafter); Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. v. General Bank, 751 F. Supp.
179, 182 (D. Or. 1990) (interpreting letter of credit in favor of beneficiary).
183. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813 (2d
Cir. 1992).
184. Id. at 817.
185. See U.C.P. art. 2 (1983); Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 139.
186. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 821
(2d Cir. 1992).
187. Id. at 822.
188. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 823
(2d Cir. 1992).
189. Id.
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In its analysis, however, the Alaska Textile court failed to
explain why the divergent results of dishonor under the UCC, as
opposed to the UCP, mandated a divergent approach for the
time within which an issuer should review documents. Nor did
the Alaska Textile court explain why that distinction was not
important in the analysis of the same court's decision in Bank of
Cochin.90
Finally, the court improperly suggested that UCC section 5-
112(1)(b) warranted application in Alaska Textile, because Bene-
ficiary never consented to having the review period relaxed
through submission of its documents on approval. 9'
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENT
Two recent cases from the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York have cited to Alaska Textile192 with-
out adopting the circuit court's rationale.
In Optopics Laboratories Corp. v. Savannah Bank of
Nigeria, Ltd., Ashford Laboratories contracted to sell
Mabson Pharmaceutical, Ltd. (Customer), a Nigerian importer,
$32,265 worth of cold capsules.'94 Customer established a let-
ter of credit to effect payment to Optopics Laboratories, Inc.
(assignee of the payments and Beneficiary) with a government-
owned bank, Savannah Bank of Nigeria (Issuer).'95 On March
22, 1993, Beneficiary brought an action against Issuer for
nonpayment of the letter of credit in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. 6 The court held that Ben-
eficiary was entitled to entry of summary judgment in its favor,
as well as payment and prejudgment interest under the letter of
credit. s7
The district court cited to Alaska Textile s8 for a descrip-
190. 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
191. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 817
(2d Cir. 1992).
192. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
193. 816 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
194. Id. at 901.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 898.
197. Id.
198. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tion of the basic function of a letter of credit.'99 Unlike Alaska
Textile, however, the Optopics court looked to an analogous pro-
vision of the UCC 200 to determine the appropriateness of pre-
judgment interest under a letter of credit because the UCP was
silent or ambiguous on the subject.2"'
In Full-Bright Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Lerner Stores, Inc.,
20 2
Hunting National Bank (Issuer) issued two letters of credit in
favor of Full-Bright Industrial Co. (Beneficiary), a Korean-based
manufacturer of ladies' wear, at the request of Lerner Stores
(Customer), a retail women's clothing chain.0 3 Customer esta-
blished the letters of credit to cover the purchase price of gar-
ments to be delivered from Korea to the United States.0 4
On April 8, 1993, Beneficiary sued Issuer in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York to recover on
the letters of credit.0 5 While Beneficiary admitted the docu-
ments contained discrepancies, it claimed Issuer was estopped
from claiming dishonor because of the delay in rejecting the
documents.0 6
The district court held that Issuer, by waiting seven and ten
days, respectively, before notifying Beneficiary of the documents'
discrepancies, acted unreasonably in violation of the UCP, so
that Beneficiary was entitled to payment.0 7
The majority opinion cited Alaska Textile,20  (without
approving or disagreeing with the reasoning), for the proposition
that the reasonableness of time for dishonor depends on the
circumstances of each case.20 9 The court in Full-Bright, how-
ever, flatly disapproved of the propriety of considering Issuer's
seeking a waiver from Customer in the determination of a rea-
199. Optopics, 816 F. Supp. at 907.
200. New York UCC provides that the beneficiary's measure of damages for
wrongful dishonor is the same as a seller's damages upon a buyer's breach of con-
tract. N.Y.U.C.C. LAW § 5-115(1) (McKinney 1984).
201. Optopics, 816 F. Supp. at 909.
202. 818 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
203. Id. at 621.
204. Id. at 619-20.
205. Id. at 619.
206. Id. at 621.
207. Full-Bright, 818 F. Supp. at 622.
208. 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
209. Full-Bright, 818 F. Supp. at 622.
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sonable time for dishonor.210
V. CONCLUSION
As a case of first impression,2 1' the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal's decision in Alaska Textile departed from the majority
of established letter of credit jurisprudence in violation of the
UCP, and raised more questions than it answered. First, the
Alaska Textile decision is inexplicably inapposite to the same
court's prior rationale in Bank of Cochin. Second, the court
offers no guidance as to which characteristics of a letter of credit
transaction should be imputed into the "reasonable time" test.
For example, when determining the limits of an issuer's
reasonable time to dishonor documents, should the sophistica-
tion of the parties;212 the number or type of documentary dis-
crepancies;" 3 the financial status of the parties;214 and the
nature and marketability of the goods2"5 be factors? Also, what
degree of importance should a court place on each of these rel-
evant considerations.
Even if the reasonable period test was workable, the court
should have construed the letters of credit against Issuer, who is
in the business of making money through offering banking ser-
vices.
It is precisely the international nature of letter of credit
transactions which requires a formalist approach. In the United
States, the approximately $200 billion in outstanding credits
210. Id.
211. Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 814 (2d
Cir. 1992).
212. See generally Bank of Cochin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F.
Supp. 1533, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting issuing bank should have anticipated de-
fects), affd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986); Rosenblith, supra note
163, at 12 (suggesting that courts holds banks to a level of sophistication).
213. See generally Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d
680, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting argument that waiver was inapplicable due to
incurability of defects).
214. Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc., 777 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (seeking waiver of discrepancies to enable beneficiary to
pay supplier), affd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Textile Co., Inc. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1992).
215. See generally Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 808
F.2d 209, 212 (2d Cir. 1986) (disallowing buyer to review documents while contem-
plating the marketability of goods).
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demonstrates a marked increase from an approximate figure of
one-half billion in 1950.216 On an international level, the use of
letters of credit as a payment mechanism is exploding,217 with
New York serving as the banking source of the world.218
As use of the letter of credit increases, so too does the
attendant litigation. 19 Accordingly, the letter of credit's profit-
ability depends upon certainty and uniformity in the law.
The court's facts and circumstance determination of a rea-
sonable time under the UCP created new risks in letter of credit
transactions, and as applied in Alaska Textile, placed the loss on
the wrong party.
EVA MAIJA MARCEAU*
216. See Task Force Report, supra note 27, at 1531.
217. See generally Worldwide List of Counties Adhering to UCP, 6 LETTER OF
CREDIT UPDATE, Dec. 1990, at 29 (indicating universal use of credit mechanism);
John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial Code,
26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579, 595 (1993) (remarking on dramatic international growth).
218. See Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
219. The number of reported cases involving international letter of credit trans-
actions in the United States doubled between 1965 and 1987. See Task Force Report,
supra note 27, at 1532.
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